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SAURABH VISHNUBHAKATT

This Essay provides an empirical account of attorney fee awards
over the last decade of patent litigation. Given the current attention
in legislative proposals and on the Supreme Court's docket to more
liberal fee shifting as a check on abusive patent litigation, a fuller
descriptive understanding of the current regime is of utmost
importance to forming sound patent-litigation policy. Following a
brief overview of judicial experience in patent cases and trends in
patent-case filing, this study presents analysis of over 200 attorney fee
award orders from 2003-2013.
This study confirms the commonsense view that, in patent
litigation, plaintiffs tend to receive attorney fee awards more often
than defendants do, and that such awards are generally larger when
defendants receive them. Notably, attorney fee awards are generally
an order of magnitude lower than prior studies have estimated.
Attorney fee awards also vary, in magnitude and distribution,
according to the technology area of the patents involved in the
dispute. Finally, attorney fee awards in patent litigation often follow
systematic calculation and discounting with explanatory discussion,
reflecting a pattern of fact-intensive evaluation by district judges of
such awards.
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INTRODUCTION

After years of reform efforts, the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA)' has changed much about the patent system-but perhaps
not its reputation. A vocal debate persists about business models that
are perceived to rely principally on asserting patents rather than on
practicing their underlying technology through manufacturing or
licensing. A decade after Intel general counsel Peter Detkin coined
the term "patent troll" describing "somebody who tries to make a lot
of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no
intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced,"2 the AIA
itself created a host of legal mechanisms to respond to this set of
business models. In administrative practice, such mechanisms include
(1) amended inter partes review and a new post-grant review to
invalidate existing patents of dubious quality,3 (2) a transitional
program for challenging the validity of certain business method
patents4 (which figure in abusive litigation to a debated extent), (3)
and an ability for third parties to submit prior art for consideration
toward pending applications to improve patent quality going
forward.6 In litigation, such mechanisms include (1) stricter joinder
rules to discourage shackling numerous unrelated defendants to each
other in a single lawsuit,' (2) an infringement defense based on prior
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
2. See Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE
RECORDER (July 30, 2001), available at http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf.
3. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, 125 Stat. at 299-313 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (amending the inter partes review provisions in Chapter 31 of
Title 35 and creating a new set of post-grant review provisions in a new Chapter 32).
4. See id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31.
5.
Compare, e.g., Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1227 (2013) (arguing that "the non-practicing entity problem is
greater with respect to business method patents than to industrial software patents"), with
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 477 (2012) (arguing that
"business methods are a relatively small part of NPE litigation").
6. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 8, 125 Stat. at 316 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
122(e)).
7. See id. § 19(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 332-33 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299). The new joinder
rule prohibits jointly suing multiple defendants in a single infringement action based solely on
the assertion of a patent or set of patents common to all. Id. Prior to the AIA, this tactic often
hobbled the ability of defendants to coordinate litigation strategy or vindicate individual
interests. An interesting effect of the new joinder rule has been a rise in separate patent
lawsuits, and a recent empirical study has shown that this rise is an artifact of § 299 rather than a
genuine rise in litigation. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz,
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) 37 (Nov. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
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commercial use to strengthen the hand of firms already practicing
later-patented technology, (3) and a bar on using a defendant's
failure to obtain advice of counsel as evidence of willful or induced
infringement.9
Yet for all these patent-specific reforms, structural criticisms
linger that patent trolls are largely immune from countersuit precisely
because they do not practice but only threaten and sueo and that the
high cost of patent litigation creates a settlement threshold below
which rational firms will pay to avoid dubious or even frivolous claims
rather than bear the higher costs of litigation to vindication." A
notable manifestation of this latter criticism is renewed interest in fee
shifting as a policy lever, and in 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides for
fee shifting in "exceptional" cases.
I. LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE ENTHUSIASM FOR PATENT FEE
SHIFTING
Much of this renewed interest proceeds from the famously high

cost of patent litigation against the backdrop of the experience of
judges with patent cases. Patent litigation has a history of forum
shoppingl2 as well as a reputation for favored judicial districts and

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346381.
8. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 5, 125 Stat. at 297-99 (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 273). The nontransferable, in personam nature of the defense underscores its objective
as a shield for economically productive activity rather than as a general weapon against patent
rights.
9. See id. § 17, 125 Stat. at 329 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 298).
10. E.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 413 (2014). But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the
Role of Non-PracticingEntities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 430 n.28 (2014)
(observing that "practicing-entity patent plaintiffs have several additional avenues of settlement
available that NPEs do not," such as cross-licensing among industry actors and leveraging
outside business relationships).
11. See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1-2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251. Pure
nuisance-value suits are only one kind of such abusive litigation, and perhaps not the most
troubling. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forestfor the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2170 (2013) (observing that "[w]hile trolls do appear more likely to
engage in abusive conduct like nuisance-value litigation, not all trolls engage in such conduct,
and practicing entities also engage in their own forms of abusive conduct").
12. For detailed empirical discussion of forum shopping in patent litigation, see generally
Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary:
Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit,52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009); Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 558 (2001).
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"rocket dockets."13 Indeed, the majority of attorney fee awards
analyzed in this study arose in just such a concentration of judicial
districts.1 Thus, the exposure of judges to patent cases has also been
heterogeneous. Of the nearly 1,000 judges who presided over patent
cases from 1995-2003, for example, a few saw over 100 cases, but
nearly 40 percent saw fewer than a handful:
Table 1. Categoriesof Judges by Patent Cases Heard (1995-2003)15
> 100

51-100

21-50

10-20

5-9

<5

4
(0.3%)

34
(2.9%)

215
(18.1%)

254
(21.4%)

215
(18.1%)

467
(39.3%)

As for the cost of patent litigation, much empirical literature has
relied on the American Intellectual Property Law Association's
biannual survey regarding attorney incomes, demographics, billing
rates, and other economic data for a benchmark. 16 The most recent
survey reports the median expense of patent litigation, inclusive of all
costs, as follows:
Table 2. Median Patent-InfringementLitigation Costs (Thousands)1 7
< $1M
$1M-$10M
$10M-$25M
$1M-$25M
> $25M

$650
n/a
n/a
$2,000
$4,500

$600
n/a
n/a
$2,500
$5,000

$650
n/a
n/a
$2,500
$5,500

$650
n/a
n/a
$2,500
$5,000

$700
$2,000
$3,325
$2,600
$5,500

13. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the PatentRocket Docket: An EmpiricalStudy of
Infringement Litigation1985-2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 60 (2011).
14. See infra Part II.B tbls.6-8 and accompanying discussion.
15. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent
Trial Court,24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 447 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 10 at 393; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 11 at
2126; Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 10 at 438 n.65. See also, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four
Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725,741 (2011); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving
the PatentSettlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 305 (2012).
17. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013)
[hereinafter AIPLA Survey].
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Under the American Rule, each side pays its own costs.' The
rise in costs has led to recent literature revisiting the appropriate role
of the American Rule in patent litigation.1 9
A. In the Congress
For its part, Congress has been receptive to this literature, with
three House bills and two Senate bills in the last two years providing
for some form of fee shifting as a check on patent litigation abuse.
Even the brief time in which these bills have emerged has produced
striking evolution in the approach of Congress to fee-shifting, from
early attempts at targeted change to broader but more welldeveloped proposals for systemic reform.
In the House of Representatives, the Saving High-Tech
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act was first
introduced in August, 2012, to address litigation over "computer
hardware or software" patents. 20 For reasons including the difficulty
of defining such patents ex ante, the bill was reintroduced in April,
2013, to address all patent litigation. 21 The current bill singles out
patentees who neither (1) had a hand in obtaining the patent, nor (2)
have substantial documented investment in practicing the patent, nor
(3) are universities or technology transfer organizations-and
requires attorney fees for any challenger of patent validity or
infringement who prevails over these patentees unless exceptional
circumstances exist. 22 Thus, it reverses the current § 285 presumption
and asymmetrically penalizes only a nonprevailing patentee. Notably,
the bill does not furnish its own definition of "exceptional" cases,
leaving intact the existing* common law. 23

18. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).
19. Compare, e.g., Emily H. Chen, Note, Making Abusers Pay: DeterringPatentLitigation
By Shifting Attorneys' Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 381 (2013) (supporting mandatory fee
shifting), with Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 59, 66 (2013) (arguing that fee shifting should not be the default rule, only used more
liberally under 35 U.S.C. § 285 where appropriate).
20. H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012).
21. H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013). See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50
Hous. L. REV. 325, 358 (2012) (discussing the broad, potentially overbroad, definition of
software patents proposed by H.R. 6245).
22. H.R. 845 § 2.
23. See Part IB, infra.
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Even more recent and further along in the legislative process is
the Innovation Act, introduced in late October 2013.24 Following
passage by the House six weeks later, it is currently before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.25 The Innovation Act also reverses the §
285 presumption in favor of fee shifting, but symmetrically applies to
non-prevailing parties regardless of litigant posture and provides
additional safeguards, including an exception for economic hardship
and a requirement for a party to certify its ability to pay shifted fees if
it does not prevail.26 Moreover, the bill does specify that a nonprevailing party may overcome the new presumption by showing that
its legal position and conduct were "reasonably justified" in law and
fact. 27
The Senate counterparts to these bills have proceeded similarly.
The Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, introduced in May 2013,
departed just as the Innovation Act later would from asymmetric fee
shifting, to apply broadly to all parties.28 It, too, reverses the § 285
presumption and specifies that a non-prevailing party may overcome
it if its legal position and conduct were "objectively reasonable and
substantially justified," or "exceptional" circumstances exist. 29
Likewise, the Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 201330 requires a legal
position and conduct that were "substantially justified" or that
"special" circumstances exist.31 Most recently, the substance of both
Senate bills was the subject of a hearing last December before the full
Judiciary Committee.3 2
In support of these Congressional proposals, the White House
has also advocated greater liberality in statutory fee shifting. This has
occurred both in the form of a legislative recommendation for greater

24. H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9, 2013).
25. ACTIONS:
H.R.
3309-113TH
CONGRESS
(2013-2014),
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3309/all-actions/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2014).
26. H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9,
2013).
27. Id. § 3(b)(1). The requirement as to litigation "conduct" was added in a Manager's
Amendment. H. Amdt. 520, 113th Cong. (2013).
28. S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013).
29. Id. § 5(a).
30. S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013).
31. Id. § 101(a).
32. Protecting Small Businesses and PromotingInnovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse:
Hearingon S. 1013 and S. 1612 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,113th Cong (2013).

2014] ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN PATENT LITIGATION

21

judicial discretion under § 285,33 as well as an endorsement of the
Innovation Act, including that bill's provisions for "reducing
unnecessary costs of patent litigation."34
Thus, together with other structural legislation such as proposed
35
heightened pleading standards for patent cases and with executive
actions such as recently proposed requirements for ongoing disclosure
of the real parties in interest behind patent owners of record,36 fee
shifting in patent litigation appears to be arriving at a stable
consensus in Congress-indeed, both political branches-on its
desirability, substantive standards, and applicable scope. Even so, the
current regime of § 285 is also before the Supreme Court as to these
same questions of standard and scope.
B. In the Courts
The standard under § 285-what is an "exceptional" case?-is
the subject of Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.37
Both firms manufacture elliptical exercise machines, in which a stroke
rail connecting the mobile foot rail to the front frame is the subject of
Icon's U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710.38 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota granted Octane summary judgment of
noninfringement3 9 and found the case unexceptional. 4 0 The Federal
Circuit affirmed and declined what it saw as Octane's invitation to
"lower the standard for exceptionality to 'objectively unreasonable'
to rebalance what it alleges is the power of large companies over

33. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec', Fact Sheet: White House
Task
Force
on
High-Tech
Patent
Issues
(June
4,
2013),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-hightech-patent-issues.
34. See Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy
on
H.R.
3309-Innovation
Act
(Dec.
3,
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr3309r_20131203.pdf.
35. See S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (as referred to the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 9, 2013).
36.
Changes To Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105
(proposed Jan 24., 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
37. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1184).
38. Id. at 59-60.
39. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319, 2011 WL 2457914, at
*1 (D. Minn. June 17, 2011).
40. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319, 2011 WL 3900975, at
*4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011).
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smaller companies" in patent litigation.41 Octane contests the Federal
Circuit's "rigid and exclusive two-part test" as an intrusion on district
judge discretion and an asymmetric burden on accused infringers.4 2
The practical scope of § 285-via deference to district court
findings on exceptionality-is the subject of Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Management Systems, Inc. 43 The case is between Pennsylvania
insurance firm Highmark and accused patent troll Allcare, which
unsuccessfully asserted against Highmark Allcare's U.S. Patent No.
5,301,105 directed to certain managed health care systems. 44 The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas found the case
exceptional and awarded Highmark attorney fees. 45 Reviewing
exceptionality de novo, the Federal Circuit reversed in part,
concluding that because certain of Allcare positions were not
"objectively unreasonable" 46 and Allcare had not engaged in litigation
misconduct,47 the case was not exceptional in those respects.48
Highmark contests de novo scrutiny as the incorrect standard of
review for § 285.49
Given the postures of the cases in relation to each other, it would
certainly be appropriate for the legal standard for § 285 that emerges
from Octane Fitness to influence or even determine the standard of
review that emerges from Highmark. That is, a broader grant of
discretion to district court judges in finding cases exceptional under §
285, as Octane proposes, is consistent with a grant of greater
deference to those findings, as Highmark proposes-indeed, these are
the very positions that the United States as amicus curiae has taken in
50
the respective cases.

41. Icon Health, 496 F. App'x. at 65.
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Icon Health, 496 F. App'x 57 (No. 12-1184).
43. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300,(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163).
44. Id. at 1306.
45. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 738 (N.D. Tex.
2010). The court relied on § 285 as well as Rule 11. Id. at 735-37.
46. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.LW. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163).
47. Id. at 1316-18.
48. Id. at 1319.
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Highmark, 687 F.3d 1300 (No. 12-1163).
50. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Icon Health &
Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir 2012) (No. 12-1185); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Highmark, 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (No. 12-1163).
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Thus, Octane's descriptions of Icon as a large patent-holding
interest restraining competition and Highmark's accusations of
trolling behavior by Allcare are of a piece with the broader narrative
of economic harm from abusive patent assertion. Yet apart from
patent doctrine and statutory construction, ongoing commentary has
also pointed out that Icon is a significant market actor and producer,
not the generally assertion-oriented troll that Octane addresses in its
larger policy argument."
What is more, Octane's proposed looser standard contemplates
only one basis for finding a case exceptional under § 285-that of
"vexatious and unjustified" litigation-and ignores fee awards that
punish litigation misconduct, willful infringement, or fraud on the
USPTO. 52 Though litigation misconduct is at issue in Highmark, the
logically prior question presented in Octane Fitness leaves open the
question of precisely how forceful a policy response to abusive patent
litigation the facts in these two cases can support.
In both the legislative and judicial settings, however, the debate
over how much more effective a mechanism fee shifting ought to be
for mediating patent litigation invites a descriptive account of its
current use.
II. TEN YEARS OF ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN PATENT LITIGATION

A. Data, Methodology, and PriorEstimates
To provide such an account, this study evaluated attorney fee
53
award data from the DocketNavigator litigation research service,
which draws all of its underlying patent litigation docket information
and court documents from the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) service.54
A search of DocketNavigator produced 243 cases in which a U.S.
district court in a patent case awarded attorney fees. By comparison
to original court filing information from PACER, DocketNavigator's
coverage of patent case filings prior to the early 2000s is somewhat

51. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Justices To Assess Attorney's Fees in Patent
Litigation
(Twice
in
One
Day!),
SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb.
24,
2014),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/argument-preview-justices-to-assess-attorneys-fees-inpatent-litigation-twice-in-one-day/.
52. Id.
53. DocketNavigator, availableat http://home.docketnavigator.com/.
54. PACER, availableat http://www.pacer.gov/.
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poor, though its coverage steadily improves up to current calendar
years." For that reason, the 16 oldest data points were dropped so
that the observation window became 2003-2013, leaving 227 attorney
fee awards. In addition to limiting the observation, the study also
omitted those attorney fee awards which the fee award orders
expressly identified as remedying litigation misconduct unrelated to
35 U.S.C. § 285 (e.g., under Rule 11), though these are arguably still
relevant to the dynamics of patent litigation expense for plaintiffs and
defendants. These totaled 11 further removals from the data, leaving
216 attorney fee awards.
Notwithstanding the question of DocketNavigator's general data
coverage, for attorney fee awards in particular, the current data
closely matches that of a prior empirical study on the incidence (but
not amounts) of attorney fee awards over the same time period.56
Liang & Berliner found 208 attorney fee awards from 2003 to May 15,
2013,"' compared to this study's 216. This independent confirmation
of the number of relevant exceptional case findings assures against
biased or nonrandom omissions of attorney fee awards in the present
study.
Relatedly, a summary examination of attorney fee awards in
patent litigation from 1985-2004 found partial data on the set of 137
fee awards: award amounts were apparent in 87 cases.5 ' From this
data, Professors Bessen and Meurer observed median attorney fee
awards of $400,000 for patentees who prevail at summary judgment,
of $780,000 for patentees who prevail at trial, of $300,000 for alleged
infringers who prevail at summary judgment, and of $980,000 for
alleged infringers who prevail at trial.59 Their finding, notably, was
consistent with AIPLA Survey data from 2001.60

55.
Coverage refers to data available in DocketNavigator as compared to the source data
available in PACER. A comparison of data on overall annual patent case filings shows that
DocketNavigator's annual coverage is less than 30 percent for cases filed before 2001, but is
over 80 percent for cases 2006 onward and over 90 percent for 2008 onward.
56. Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in PatentLitigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 59
(2013).
57. Id. at 87.
58. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 59, 80-82 (2012).

59. Id. at 81 tbl.6.
60. Id. The 2001 AIPLA Survey estimated that litigation cost through trial was $499,000
when the stakes were less than $1 million, $1,499,000 when the stakes were between $1 million
and $25 million, and $2,992,000 when the stakes were greater than $25,000,000. Id. at 81-82; cf
supra note 17, and accompanying table (showing a marked increase from 2001).
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B. Discussion
Consistent with Liang and Berliner and with Bessen and Meurer,
this study finds that about 71% of attorney fee awards go to plaintiffs
and about 29% to defendants.61 Inconsistent with Bessen and
Meurer, however, the magnitudes of fee awards more clearly favor
defendants from 2003-2013.62 At the median, attorney fee awards
made to defendants were about 2.4-fold more than those to plaintiffs.
Adding back in the 11 attorney fee awards for non-§ 285 reasons such
as litigation misconduct, plaintiffs' median remains about the same,
but defendants' median rises by nearly 50%, leading to a 3.3-fold
disparity. These findings are further illustrated in Tables 3 and 4 and
Figure 1.
Table 3. Median Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation for
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003-2013)

$46,354.00

$45,287.00

$109,466.00

$148,430.00

2.4-fold higher for
defendants

3.3-fold higher for
defendants

61. Liang and Berliner found a 68%-32% split (142 plaintiff awards and 66 defendant
awards). See Liang & Berliner, supra note 56, at 87-88. Bessen and Meurer also found a 68%32
% split (59 patentee awards and 28 alleged infringer awards). See Bessen & Meurer, supra
note 58, at 81 tbl.6.

62. Bessen and Meurer found only a 1.26-fold difference for post-trial fee awards to
alleged infringers versus patentees during 1985-2004. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 58, at
81 tbl.6.
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Table 4. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards for Plaintiffs and
Defendants (2003-2013)
$0-1K
$1K-10K
$10K-100K

4
27
62

0
2
24

$100K-1M
$1M-10M
$10M-100M
All

39
21
0
153 (70.8%)

22
13
2
63 (29.2%)

Figure 1. Distribution of Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation for
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003-2013)
70

60 50
Number of 40 Awards 30
3020

10
0
R $0-1K
M$100k-1M

Plaintiff
* $1K-10K
* $1M-10M

Defendant
S$10K-100K
I$10M-100M

In a marked departure from Professors Bessen and Meurer's
findings, observed median attorney fee awards from 2003-2013 were
about an order of magnitude lower than the seven-figure estimates
that correspond with 2001 AIPLA data. 63 This discrepancy between
fees charged and fees awarded suggests that district judges may apply
discounting as well.
Attorney-fee-award amounts also varied by technology. Using
the well-established Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg (HJT) typology' that
63.
64.

See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER
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maps U.S. Patent Classification categories 65 to six broad technology
categories, each patent case is identifiable by the technology
classifications of the patents involved in that case. 66
Comparing across technologies as shown in Table 5 and Figure 2,
the distributions of attorney fee awards vary in both magnitude and
skew. For example, "Chemical" cases saw 10 fee awards, but
"Computers & Communications" cases saw 42. Fee awards skewed
toward the $1K-$10K range for "Computers & Communications"
and "Drugs & Medical" cases, but "Mechanical" cases saw more
$100K-1 million awards, and "Electrical and Electronic" cases saw
more awards over $10 million.
Table 5. Distributionof Attorney Fee Awards in PatentLitigationfor
Plaintiffs and Defendants (2003-2013)

$0-1K
$1K-10K
$10K-100K
$100k-1M
$1M-10M
$10M-100M

0
0
5
2
3
0
10
(4.5%)

0
4
18
10
9
1

0
2
14
10
4
1

0
6
6
9
10
0

1
3
9
15
5
0

3
13
29
17
11
0

42
31
31
33
73
(19.1%) (14.1%) (14.1%) (15.0%) (33.2%)

Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, NBER Working Paper
8498 (2001), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.
65.

See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Office of Patent Classification,

available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/index.jsp.
66. Though most multi-patent cases fell into a single technology, some multipletechnology designations did occur.
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Figure 2. Distributionof Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation by
Technology (2003-2013)
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Finally, a review of the attorney fee award orders themselves
reveals interrelated trends pertaining to judicial experience with
patent cases.
First, attorney fee awards in patent cases appear to reflect a
distribution of judicial experience similar to that which patent cases
reflect more generally. Districts where fee awards originate are much
the same as where litigants file patent cases in general. As Table 6
shows, a large plurality of attorney fee awards in patent litigation
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during 2003-2013 came from a small number of districts. As Tables 7
and 8 further show, the six districts that produced over 40 percent of
fee awards were also among the leading districts in filings.
Table 6. Distributionof Attorney Fee Awards in PatentLitigation
Across JudicialDistricts (2003-2013)
1
22

2-6
24

7-12
6

13-18
1

19-24
0

25-30
0

31-36
0

37-42
1

Table 7. Judicial Districts That Produced the Most Attorney Fee

Awards in PatentLitigation (2003-2013)

I- tit

mtd ltse

C.D. Cal.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D. Cal.
N.D. Ga.
E.D. Tex.
Subtotal

38
15
11
10
10
8
92 (42.6%)

mw

Awrsi

40
16
11
11
10
10
98 (43.4%)

Table 8. Nationwide Rank in Patent Case Filings of JudicialDistricts
That Produced the Most Attorney Fee Awards in Patent Litigation
(2003-2013)
C.D. Cal.
N.D.Cal.
N.D.Ill.
S.D. Cal.
N.D. Ga.
E.D. Tex.

1
2
3
13
21
15

1
2
3
15
13
8

1
2
4
13
11
3

1
3
6
13
8
2

2
6
5
9
11
1

2
4
6
8
11
1

1
4
6
8
16
2

4
5
3
13
16
1

3
4
5
10

3
4
5
9

3
4
6
5

17
1

16
1

18
1

Second, many of the patent attorney fee award orders themselves
show systematic calculation of the attorney fees incurred by
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prevailing parties as well as subsequent discounting by the district
judge, that is, in the interest of fairness or to mitigate perceived
overbilling, duplicative work product, and the like. For example, of
the patent attorney fee award orders reviewed, 45 orders expressly
discuss a lodestar calculation in determining the amount of the fee
award. 67 The lodestar method has been the general rule for attorney
fee award calculations for over 30 years since the Supreme Court
adopted it in Hensley v. Eckerhart68 relying, in turn, on the factintensive twelve-part analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 69 Given its widespread use, the 45
orders are likely an undercount of how many fee awards overall rely
on the lodestar approach implicitly, e.g., through attorney briefings or
magistrate recommendations on the issue.
This discursive application of the lodestar method is important
because despite the method's well-established usage, a significant
portion of fee awards still apply it, not as rote affair, but with
deliberate attention to the facts at hand. The 45 orders represent 25
different judicial districts, nearly half (and a disproportionately active
half at that) of the 54 districts that produced attorney fee awards in
patent litigation from 2003-2013. These 25 districts account for 145
fee awards, or two-thirds of all 216 fee awards. Not least, the six
districts that led in attorney fee awards in patent litigation and led
among patent case filings more generally70 were also all represented
among the 45 orders that expressly discuss the lodestar method.
CONCLUSION

To a considerable degree, therefore, judges' awards of patent
attorney fees reflect their growing experience and familiarity with
patent cases as well as their fact-intensive evaluation of litigation
costs, notwithstanding the variety of fee awards that results across
litigant posture or technology.

67. For a concise discussion of the lodestar method, see, for example, George B. Murr,
Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product According to the Market For Claims:
Reformulating the Lodestar Method, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 599, 602-09 (2000). The lodestar
method begins by multiplying the reasonably expended amount of attorney time by a
reasonable rate of compensation, followed by adjustment of the initial estimate based on the
circumstances of the case.
68. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
69. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. See supra Part II.B tbls.7-8.

